<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><oembed><version><![CDATA[1.0]]></version><provider_name><![CDATA[In Moscow's Shadows]]></provider_name><provider_url><![CDATA[https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com]]></provider_url><author_name><![CDATA[Mark Galeotti]]></author_name><author_url><![CDATA[https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/author/markgaleotti/]]></author_url><title><![CDATA[&#8216;Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus: an investigator&#8217;s perspective&#8217;]]></title><type><![CDATA[link]]></type><html><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://inmoscowsshadows.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/pub1111.jpg"><img class="alignleft  wp-image-926" title="PUB1111" src="https://inmoscowsshadows.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/pub1111.jpg?w=144&#038;h=216" alt="" width="144" height="216" /></a>The US Army War College&#8217;s Strategic Studies Institute has just published <a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1111" target="_blank"><em><strong>Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives</strong></em></a> (SSI, 2012), edited by Stephen Blank. Along with &#8216;Russia&#8217;s Choice: change or degradation?&#8217; by Lilia Shevtsova and &#8216;The Impossibility of Russian Economic Reform&#8217; by Steven Rosefielde, it contains my article &#8216;Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus: an investigator&#8217;s perspective.&#8217; Written for an SSI workshop back in September 2011, it uses a slightly over-extended metaphor (of the classic criminal investigator&#8217;s search for means, motive and opportunity) to assess the prospects primarily for military reform but also reform of the police and security agencies. Shevtsova&#8217;s piece, clearly revised for the December 2011 developments, is pretty apocalyptic. Rosefielde is characteristically downbeat: &#8220;The likelihood of Russia&#8217;s economy becoming sustainably competitive with its main rivals by reforming its Muscovite co-governance mechanism is nil.&#8221; (48)</p>
<p>In this context, I am the optimist in the trinity, in that I see military reform as being <a href="http://themoscownews.com/siloviks_scoundrels/20120116/189372947.html">surprisingly successful</a>; by no means a done deal (the key future issues will be personnel and reforming procurement and the defense-industrial sector) but certainly looking a great deal more encouraging that we might have expected given the numerous false starts of the past twenty years. (Especially given <a href="http://themoscownews.com/siloviks_scoundrels/20120524/189764767.html">Serdyukov&#8217;s survival</a> in the new government.) I assess <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mark-galeotti/medvedev%E2%80%99s-law-on-police-quiet-revolution">police reform</a> as less successful, but certainly progressing and within the realms of possibility, but confess I am much less bullish about the prospects for meaningful reform of the security apparatus. There&#8217;s a summary of my chapter on the <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/22/this_week_at_war_a_leaner_cleaner_russian_military">Foreign Policy website</a>, but you can just download the whole book on the SSI site <a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1111">here</a>.</p>
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