<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><oembed><version><![CDATA[1.0]]></version><provider_name><![CDATA[In Moscow's Shadows]]></provider_name><provider_url><![CDATA[https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com]]></provider_url><author_name><![CDATA[Mark Galeotti]]></author_name><author_url><![CDATA[https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/author/markgaleotti/]]></author_url><title><![CDATA[A Roundup of Ukraine-related&nbsp;Writings]]></title><type><![CDATA[link]]></type><html><![CDATA[<div data-shortcode="caption" id="attachment_2244" style="width: 310px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><a href="https://inmoscowsshadows.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/img_2261.jpg"><img class="size-medium wp-image-2244" src="https://inmoscowsshadows.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/img_2261.jpg?w=300&#038;h=225" alt="A new chill in the Moscow air?" width="300" height="225" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">A new chill in the Moscow air?</p></div>
<p>Just a quick round-up of some recent, largely Ukraine-centred writings. What can one read into the latest Victory Day celebrations? In <a href="http://readrussia.com/2014/05/10/deconstructing-victory-day/"><em>Deconstructing Victory Day</em></a> for <em>Russia!</em> magazine, I suggest the answer is a country increasingly able to fight modern hybrid wars, but with a people disinclined to do so, despite the increasingly ideological tone of <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/21/putin_s_empire_of_the_mind_russia_geopolitics"><em>Putin&#8217;s Empire of the Mind</em></a>, explored in <em>Foreign Policy</em>. This helps explain why <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/moscows-war-in-ukraine-relies-on-local-assets/498851.html"><i>Moscow&#8217;s War in Ukraine Relies on Local Assets</i></a>, as I wrote in the <em>Moscow Times</em>, even if this means, as I discuss in <em>Foreign Policy</em>, that <em><a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/01/ukraines_mob_war_mafia_russia">Ukraine&#8217;s Mob War</a></em> even means that organised crime has become part of Russia&#8217;s resources, just a particularly extreme example of <a href="http://readrussia.com/2014/04/11/the-new-great-gamers-covert-civilian-and-clueless-soldiers-of-the-modern-battlespace/"><em>The New Great Gamers: covert, clueless and civilian soldiers of the new battlespace</em></a>. Of course, this all contributes to the toxic mess that will be left when the conflict is over, such that one can almost <em><a href="http://readrussia.com/2014/05/06/pity-the-winner-in-eastern-ukraine/">Pity the Winner in Eastern Ukraine</a>. </em>Nonetheless, this poses a serious challenge to the security institutions of the West, as I explore in <a href="https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/04/26/nato-and-the-new-war-dealing-with-asymmetric-threats-before-they-become-kinetic/"><em>NATO and the new war: dealing with asymmetric threats before they become kinetic</em></a>, and even its security and intelligence community, in that if we are to understand <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-mi5-and-cia-can-fight-the-russian-threat/499661.html"><em>How MI5 and CIA Can Fight the Russian Threat</em></a>, this will have to start with understanding the nature of that threat. After all, one of the key lessons of <a href="http://www.bne.eu/content/comment-putin-ukraine-and-asymmetric-politics"><em>Putin, Ukraine and asymmetric politics</em></a>, as I discuss in <em>Business New Europe</em>, is that this is <a href="http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&amp;id=178660"><em>Not a New Cold War: Great Game II,</em></a> closer to 19thC geopolitics but fought with 21stC means and memes.</p>
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