<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><oembed><version><![CDATA[1.0]]></version><provider_name><![CDATA[The Dish]]></provider_name><provider_url><![CDATA[http://dish.andrewsullivan.com]]></provider_url><author_name><![CDATA[Andrew Sullivan]]></author_name><author_url><![CDATA[https://dish.andrewsullivan.com/author/sullydish/]]></author_url><title><![CDATA[Victor Davis Hanson,&nbsp;Fabulist]]></title><type><![CDATA[link]]></type><html><![CDATA[In his <a href="http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2007/08/weimar-watch-i.html">NRO splutter</a> this morning, military expert Victor Davis Hanson hyperbolized the following:</p><blockquote><p>No one necessarily believes anything in once respected magazines, whether the Periscope section of Newsweek or anything published in The New Republic. </p></blockquote><p>Let me suggest two articles in The New Republic that no one should have believed at the time, two articles that have been debunked by subsequent events, two articles that reveal spectacular misjudgment about the war in Iraq, two articles that should consign the author to irrelevance, unless he has explicitly explained why he was wrong and apologized. The two articles, of course, are by Victor Davis Hanson. Let's roll the tape, shall we? The first is <a href="http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040607&amp;s=hanson060704">an argument</a> that counter-insurgency works best when American troops stay in their tanks and kill people. It's a June 2004 defense of a strategy not exactly identical with the Petraeus strategy Hanson is now touting. Money quote:</p><blockquote><p>For their part, American troops have discovered that they are safer on the assault when they can fire first and kill killers, rather than simply patrol and react, hoping their newly armored Humvees and fortified flak vests will deflect projectiles.  This is the context for the current insistence on more troops. America's failure to promptly retake Falluja or rid Najaf of militiamen demands more soldiers to garrison the ever more Fallujas and Najafs that will now surely arise. In contrast, audacity is a force multiplier. A Sadr in chains or in paradise is worth more, in terms of deterrence, than an entire infantry division. ]]></html></oembed>