<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><oembed><version><![CDATA[1.0]]></version><provider_name><![CDATA[The Dish]]></provider_name><provider_url><![CDATA[http://dish.andrewsullivan.com]]></provider_url><author_name><![CDATA[Andrew Sullivan]]></author_name><author_url><![CDATA[https://dish.andrewsullivan.com/author/sullydish/]]></author_url><title><![CDATA[The Evolution Of&nbsp;Morals]]></title><type><![CDATA[link]]></type><html><![CDATA[<p>Paul Bloom <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v464/n7288/full/464490a.html">thinks about</a> moral development: </p><blockquote> <p>[M]any psychologists think that the reasoned arguments we make about why we have certain beliefs are mostly post-hoc justifications for gut reactions. As the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt puts it, although we like to think of ourselves as judges, reasoning through cases according to deeply held principles, in reality we are more like lawyers, making arguments for positions that have already been established. This implies we have little conscious control over our sense of right and wrong. I predict that this theory of morality will be proved wrong in its wholesale rejection of reason. ]]></html></oembed>