<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><oembed><version><![CDATA[1.0]]></version><provider_name><![CDATA[The Dish]]></provider_name><provider_url><![CDATA[http://dish.andrewsullivan.com]]></provider_url><author_name><![CDATA[Andrew Sullivan]]></author_name><author_url><![CDATA[https://dish.andrewsullivan.com/author/sullydish/]]></author_url><title><![CDATA[The Consequences Of&nbsp;Disengagement?]]></title><type><![CDATA[link]]></type><html><![CDATA[
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"></span>While urging &quot;strategic patience&quot; in the Middle East, Ryan Crocker <a href="http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23546">writes</a> that &quot;disengagement from Pakistan and Afghanistan after the Soviet retreat in 1989 ultimately gave al-Qaeda the space to plan the 9/11 attacks.&quot; Greg Scoblete <a href="http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2010/07/strategic_patience.html">begs to differ</a>: </p>
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<p>Can Crocker, or anyone &#8211; offer a remotely plausible scenario which sees the U.S. &quot;engaged&quot; in Afghanistan in the 1980s that prevents the rise of al Qaeda internationally? Bin Laden <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_Laden#Formation_and_structuring_of_Al-Qaeda">wasn&#39;t even in Afghanistan </a>until 1996. As we&#39;re learning now, the problem in Afghanistan isn&#39;t American engagement or lack thereof, it&#39;s Pakistan&#39;s regional interests. Maybe there was a magical formula available to the U.S. in the 1980s that changes Pakistan&#39;s interests in Afghanistan so that it didn&#39;t use the country as a dumping ground for the ISI&#39;s fundamentalists. But I doubt it.</p>
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