The secret documents declassified by the United States and received by Justice Minister Germán Garabano this Friday include a CIA Intelligence Information Report dated August 16, 1977, which describes in detail the bureaucratic side of Plan Condor. The report is not classified secret, but begins with the warning that it includes “sensitive intelligence sources and methods,” to warn that it can not be disseminated to prevent agents, sources or ways of stealing papers being compromised.

The document warns headquarters that the intelligence services of five countries and “to some extent Brazil” signed a cooperation agreement in September 1976 for “operations against subversive targets”. The CIA makes a previously unheard of distinction in the mechanics of the Condor Plan by stating that “Condor” is the name of the cooperation pact, which in practice is known as “Operation Teseo”.

The CIA agents in Argentina who wrote the report claim to have seen a copy of the original, which begins with a paragraph entitled “Regulations of Theseus, Operations Center”. The first topic is defining the mission, which consists of identifying targets “according to the requests presented by the participants, and assigning opportunities and priorities”. The Operations Center must instruct intelligence and operations teams, who must first locate and identify the targets then kill them and escape.

In military style, the Center is responsible for managing the human and material resources of each operation, instructing the services of each country on what collaboration to provide and reminding them that, as agreed, foreign services must give priority to the requirements of Operation Teseo.

Organizational chart.

Operation Teseo is based in Buenos Aires, known as Condor 1 in internal jargon. The Operations Center is formed by permanent representatives of the intelligence services of the participating countries. Intelligence and operations teams, “made up of personnel from the member countries”, and reserve teams are placed under the orders of this Center in the event that problems arise. These teams are prohibited from visiting the Operations Centre unless specifically instructed to do so.

According to the document, “the minimum number of agents provided by each participating service will be, if possible, four, and eventually a woman will be included. Each country will have a similar team in reserve, ready to cover any eventuality”.

Travel expenses.

The Operations Center in Argentina is in charge of administering the funds of Operation Teseo, as well as receiving settlements of expenses for each task group. Each participating country contributed a quota of ten thousand dollars to initiate the operation and agreed to contribute a similar figure at the end of each operation, “within a period of no more than fifteen days”.

Outside of these operating expenses, the Condor is like a club in which each country pays a fee of two hundred dollars per month “which expires on the thirtieth of each month”. This modest figure is to “cover operating and maintenance costs of the Operations Centre”.

But so much economic modesty contradicts the operating expenses foreseen in the same regulation. Foreign task forces receive an estimated $3500 a day per person, plus a fixed amount of $1,000 for clothing. All of these expenses must be submitted to the head office by the group leaders for approval by the participating members. If there is no objection, each permanent representative has a duty to communicate with his or her government to cover the funds of the Operations Center.

Separately, the agents received equipment from the Operations Center or, if not possible, from the local intelligence services. This included weapons, ammunition, explosives, documents, clothing, electronic and communications equipment, and “miscellaneous”.

Organization.

Teams”, as the CIA calls task forces, “will be formed by members of one or more services according to their experience, personal qualifications and target characteristics”. The Operations Center determines which target to eliminate and when. Once the decision has been made, intelligence teams have the task of “identifying the target, locating, following, communicating with the Operations Center and exiting”. Only one member of the intelligence team and can make contact with the team. That agent has to ensure that the information reaches the operatives showing them the target, then leaving the scene.

The operations team has to “execute the target” in three steps: “A, intercept the target, B, fulfill the operation, and C, escape. For security reasons, members of each team cannot know each other. The only ones who speak are the heads of each task force.

Embassies.

Operation Teseo has its own communications network called Condortel, to handle all traffic between the Operations Center and the services of the participating countries. If necessary, there will be a telephone call from the central office in Buenos Aires.

However, if it is necessary to send documents, papers of any kind, it is determined that the “diplomatic pouch” of the respective embassies, or special envoys who know the necessary security measures, will be used.

A democracy.

The final chapter of the CIA document indicates that the Teseo Operations Center takes two hours for lunch, since it operates from 9.30 to 12.30 and from 14.30 to 19.30. Only if there is an ongoing operation are the timetables extended by appointing a “night shift officer”, rotating nationality among the permanent members. Bureaucratically, it is established that accommodation, meals and transportation for this officer will be paid for by the Operations Centre.

And here is a surprise, right at the end: the Condor functioned as an internal democracy where people voted among equals. In choosing the targets, the CIA document explains, “each representative presents his selection of a target in the form of a proposal. The final selection of a target will be determined by a simple majority vote. In case of disagreement, a record of the debate is made, which will be signed by the respective representatives and sent to the corresponding services for their information.

Expansion.

While the CIA obtained the founding and organizational documents of Condor, the State Department’s Office of Intelligence and Investigations circulated its analysis of coordination in the South American continent. In a report dated October 6, 1977, now circulated without omission or erasure, diplomats speculate on the possible formation of a South American bloc through intelligence coordination. They rightly rule out the possibility because of “pre-existing enmities” and because Brazil does not show much enthusiasm for the idea and prefers to invest in its own international promotional efforts.

A new topic appears in the text, the idea of opening operational offices for Plan Condor in the United States and Western Europe. The mission of these offices will be to “address the assassination of alleged subversive opponents of participating governments (in Condor) living in Western Europe”. According to diplomatic sources, the three countries “most enthusiastic” about the idea are Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, due to the activity of their respective exiles. Brazil, the analysis says, is not interested and rejected the idea. According to the State Department, Brazilians do not want to pay the political cost of such an operation or be associated with the notorious Chilean DINA.

Countries interested in operating in Europe did so through their embassies, creating notorious intelligence structures, such as the Argentinian embassy in Paris.