<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><oembed><version><![CDATA[1.0]]></version><provider_name><![CDATA[longandvariable]]></provider_name><provider_url><![CDATA[https://longandvariable.wordpress.com]]></provider_url><author_name><![CDATA[Tony Yates]]></author_name><author_url><![CDATA[https://longandvariable.wordpress.com/author/anthonyyates01/]]></author_url><title><![CDATA[Mario:  don&#8217;t wait until you &#8216;see&#8217; deflation]]></title><type><![CDATA[link]]></type><html><![CDATA[<p>Draghi recently commented that &#8216;we are not seeing deflation&#8217;.  He elaborated.  They weren&#8217;t &#8216;seeing&#8217; people postpone purchases until prices fell.  The ECB were ready to act [presumably when they did &#8216;see it&#8217;].  But there was no need to act further now.</p>
<p>A few points.</p>
<p>1.  It is probably too late if you wait until you are &#8216;seeing it&#8217;.  The time to act is before you see it.  Monetary policy works with long and variable lags, and has to be proactive as a consequence.</p>
<p>2.  The risks of deflation are tangible and mounting.  Analysts reckon that some of the fall in inflation in the euro area is temporary.  But there must be a risk that this fall causes panic, and detaches inflation expectations from the ECB&#8217;s target.</p>
<p>3.  This is especially true since the ECB don&#8217;t have a tried and tested way to loosen.  They seem unable or unlikely to try QE Fed or BoE style, because of the exposure to troubled &#8216;peripheral&#8217; bonds that would entail, and the lack of any agreement, or a mechanism to facilitate one, to take such measures.  They could try Forward Guidance in the style of &#8216;lower for longer&#8217;.  But the effects of this are likely to be muted.  A low yield curve can&#8217;t be lowered all that much.  And having muddied the waters somewhat with Forward Guidance ECB-style, [which was about explaining what would happen anyway to rates, not marking a change in the reaction function] it doesn&#8217;t seem likely to me that a switch to lower for longer forward guidance could generate all that much of a change in the outlook for ECB rates, and may simply generate confusion.</p>
<p>4.  It would be nice if there were a coordinated fiscal polity able to loosen to make up for the impotence of monetary policy.  But of course there isn&#8217;t!  There are fiscal units within the euro area that are either insolvent, or close to it.  And Germany, which isn&#8217;t, would be averse to a further fiscal stimulus.</p>
<p>5. It&#8217;s possible that saying &#8216;we don&#8217;t yet see the disaster that would befall us if we were too late to act&#8217; is a way simply to talk down the risks of deflation, since there is nothing further the ECB could do, or for which a consensus on the Council could be mustered.  If that&#8217;s the case, then it would be justified.  There may be costs to pay, if people come to understand that you don&#8217;t explain the risks how you see them, but how you want markets to see them.  But now may not be the time to worry about the finer points of time-consistent communication.  If diminishing the risks of deflation helps anchor inflation expectations and make deflation less likely, why not try it.</p>
<p>6.  Steve Williamson points out correctly that there is no coherent theoretical account of the supposed mechanism whereby deflation leads to a vicious cycle of ever lower output and lower inflation.  But personally, if I was a policy maker, with a voice on the ECB Governing Council, the lack of such a model would not convince me to be relaxed about the recent slide in inflation.</p>
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